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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
holder or officer of a corporation in its service is 'in the service of another' within the meaning of the statute, since the corporation is a
legal entity distinct from any of its stockholders or officers." This
would seem to indicate that by carrying the fiction of corporate entity
into the field of workmen's compensation, Massachusetts has created a
presumption that corporation officers are employees within the meaning of the statute. The facts of the case emphasize the extent of the
departure from the result usually attained, since it was shown that the
claimant, who was treasurer and owned nearly half the issued stock,
had voluntarily assumed the duties of a workman. Thus the case is
directly contradictory to the Carville case on the facts.
While the jurisdictional question raised in the principal case will
not recur frequently, the decision as to the employee status of a corporation executive has importance as the first judicial pronouncement
in the state determining the right of such executives to recover under
the statute. The court, citing with approval In re Haynes-, supra,
adopted the "nature of the duties" test. The use of the control and
supervision test, the traditional common law requirement for the employer-employee relationship,, is more logically consistent with the
statutory definition of "employee" as a person under a contract of
hire. Hbwever, the "duties" test allows the court a greater latitude in
permitting recovery to officers of small corporations, conceivably within
the intent of the legislature, while still withholding recovery from
officers of larger corporations, to whom, as the dissenting justice remarked, the compensation would mean little more than "pocket money."
It should be noted that in some of the states which originally adopted
the control and supervision test, the strict rule originally adopted has
often been modified. As pointed out in In re Haynes, supra, this liberal approach to the question of a corporation executive's right to recover under the several Workmen's Compensation Acts is also desirable
in the light of the policy consideration of fostering and promoting
small corporate enterprise.
William M. Dickson
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CONGRESS MAKES

A LAW:

The Story Behind the Employment Act

of 1946. By Stephen Kemp Bailey.' New York City: Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. xii, 282. $3.75.-In his classic study on congressional government, Woodrow Wilson observed sixty-five years ago
that "Authority [in Congress] is perplexingly subdivided and distributed, and responsibility has to be hunted down in out-of-the-way
corners"; because of this, "the means of working for the fruits of
1 Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.
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good government are not readily found." 2 That this also constitutes
the major theme of a current work on congressional government
would seem less a tribute to Wilson's prescience than to the property
of inertia which inheres in political and other social institutions. In
Wilson's work, the theme appears virtually in postulational form. In
Stephen Kemp Bailey's Congress Makes a Law, the "postulate"
is subjected to a critical examination in the crucible of experiene.
Selected for the test was the highly controversial Employment Act of
1946 3 - a most fortunate choice, because the impact of the forces
that it unleashed set into motion, and thus exposed for study, virtually all of the important parts of the machinery of congressional
government. Hardly a phase of this machinery escaped the scrutinizing eye of the author. From the planning stage, through the periods
of gestation and birth-each step in the genesis of the Employment
Act of 1946 was detailed with admirable precision and clarity. When
the official hearings, reports and debates did not suffice as source materials, no effort seemed to be spared in tracking doWn the information by correspondence and interviews. When to all of this is added
the rare virtue of an engaging style, one should have no hesitance in
regarding this little volume as one of the most illuminating studies of
congressional government yet to appear inprint.
To those who conceive of legislation as a tidy bit of routinized
business, a reading of Congress Makes a Law should suggest that there
is an untidy side to the process - a side that must not be overlooked.
The story of the Employment Act of 1946 makes dramatically clear
how difficult it often is to predict whether a legislative proposal will
ever come to life, and if it does, in what shape it will finally emerge;
it suggests how fortuitous are the creative and abortive forces that are
at play in the process. Too often one thinks of these "forces" exclusively in terms of pressure groups, that is, the organized functional
interests that have a particular stake in the passage, modification, or
defeat of a legislative proposal. One of the chief contributions of the
present study is the light shed upon the influence that can be wielded
by a determined, aggressive group of staff members employed on the
legislative committee to which a proposal is sent after its "second
reading" on the floor. Indeed, the title of the book could well have
been: Congress Makes a Law, or The Saga of the Staff in Room 15A.
'15A" is the number of the Senate room which housed the staff of
the committee considering the Full Employment Bill. From these
quarters there emerged an incredible number of plans for galvanizing
functional groups into action - action in favor of the passage of the
measure; there came successive drafts of Bills with "appeasement
Z
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60 STAr. 23, 15 U. S. C. § 1021 (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 16, 15 U. S.
C. § 1024 (b) (Supp. 1948).
3
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clauses" to deflect or pacify the ruffled feelings of the opposition;
speeches and articles were drafted in profusion and fed to interested
proponents of the measure; "proper" witnesses were contacted and
selected for appearances at the hearing stage; agenda were prepared;
parliamentary strategy was mapped; political deals were arranged;
competition was eased between members of Congress vying for a
share of the "full employment" limelight; the timing of the skirmishes
on and off the floor was planned with an eye towards obtaining the
maximum yield from the forces that were marshalled behind the Bill.
All in all, the staff members constituted the nerve and brain center
from which emanated legislative plans for achieving full employment,
and through which was sought the ultimate marriage between final plan
and political acquiescence. The conclusion is inescapable that whoever captures control of a legislative committee and, through it, the
appointment and control of the staff, has a tremendously powerful
weapon at his command. No wonder committee chairmanships and
positions of seniority are eyed with such political relish!
The experiences under the Employment Act of 1946 propel the
author to the view that the committee system in Congress has an
inordinate amount of power in the shaping of national policies. Yet,
despite the furious pace in Room 15A, despite the tremendous energies
that were expended by those who manipulated the powers of the committee for partisan ends, the Full Employment Act of 1946 emerged
a mere toothless shadow of its original self - which suggests, of
course, that the methods of fighting in the legislative arena are legion,

and that the capture of one major fortress, however advantageous,
does not necessarily mean that the battle is won. Indeed, the methods
are so varied, and the power so diffuse, as to make it impossible in
many instances to identify those upon whom the responsibility for the
defeat or passage of a legislative proposal can be pinned. The author
bemoans this defect in our system, flirts with the idea of increasing
responsibility by increasing the powers of the President and the national political parties, but leaves it entirely to the reader's imagination to determine for himself whether it really can be done.
Julius Cohen*

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SuRETYsIp.

By Laurence P.

Simp-

son.' St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1950. Pp. xiv, 569. $7.00.-In clarity, conciseness and arrangement of material, this is one of the best texts
in the Hornbook Series. It supersedes Dean Arant's volume on Surety*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
I Professor of Law, New York University.
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ship 2 published in the same series nearly twenty years ago, and
admirably covers the gap of the two decades. Professor Simpson's
text, in this reviewer's opinion, is written with greater clarity than
its predecessor. While much of the earlier volume reappears intact in
the present text, the latter is much more than a mere revision. Arant's
thesis that the courts should adopt the test of variation of the surety's risk as the measure of the surety's discharge, which was an interesting, if not somewhat contentious feature of the earlier volume, has
been dropped. Professor Simpson's view that the test is rather the
infringement of the surety's rights is more in accord with the cases.
This accounts in part for the more expanded development of the chapter on Surety's Rights (from fifty pages in Arant to one hundred
pages in Simpson).
A student text to be of real value should avoid equally the extremes of tendentious assertion of the writer's own convictions as to
what the law should be and the "paste pot and shears" compilations
drawn from head-notes and digests. Not all of the hornbook authors
have been so successful as Simpson in finding the golden mean. As
an illustration: Professor Simpson in his casebook on Suretyship, 3
published in 1942, stated in the Preface that:
The rapid progress . . . in development of the differentiation between

the rules applicable to the accommodation and the paid surety, if it has
materialized at all, can best be described as glacial. Here and there,
however, as brought out in the included cases, a court formerly committed to the strictissimi juris doctrine has advanced a cautious toe into
the cold water of liberalization, limiting the discharge of the paid surety
to the extent of injury shown.

In the present hornbook, the carefully phrased black-letter of section 30 rests content with stating the glacial movement thus far. The
temptation to pontificate presently over the future is successfully resisted.
Chapters on Official and Judicial Bonds, lacking in the earlier text
of Dean Arant, have been added and greatly increase the practical
value of the new volume. Larger type and double instead of single
columns for the footnotes make for ease in reading. The table of cases
is increased and reflects well the developing case law of the past
twenty years. A table of citations to the Restatement proves helpful.
In these days when law school curricula show "strange sounding
names" in increasing numbers, crowding the old "fundamental" courses
into narrow quarters or relegating them to "outside reading" or
2

3

ARANT, HANDoox OF TnE LAW or SuRrsn P_AND GuARANTY (1931).
SIMPSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP (1942).
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"seminars," Professor Simpson's text is surely to be welcomed by students and teachers alike. In addition, it has demonstrated again the
integrity of the Suretyship course. This reviewer who has used with
satisfaction and pleasure Professor Simpson's casebook gladly recommends the author's new text.
Edward F. Barrett*

THE FE naAL INCOME TAx:

A Guide to the Law.

By Joyce Stan-

ley and Richard Kilcullen. 1 New York City: The Tax Club Press,
1948. Pp. xv, 334. $6.00.-For the student and practitioner, this little
book affords the means of obtaining a sound general knowledge of the
salient provisions of existing law relating to the federal income tax.
It is a guide, not a treatise or even a hornbook in the usual sense.
One who has some familiarity with the subject matter can read the
book with profit in a few hours. He would gain thereby a clear view
of the arrangement of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code as
well as of the relationship of these statutory provisions to one another.
He would also be put in a position to grasp the significance of many
of the provisions with which he had previously only a bowing acquaintance.

It is doubtful that much sustenance would be derived from the
book without some previous knowledge on the reader's part of the
basic material involved, that is, the Internal Revenue Code itself,
the income tax regulations (Regulations 111), and certain important
decisions of the courts. The authors state that the book is designed
to be read with the Internal Revenue Code and that, to a lesser extent, the pertinent provisions of the regulations should be read along
with the text material. If a novice in the field of federal income taxation were to follow the procedure indicated, he would undoubtedly
find this guide to the law of great assistance in indicating what are the
important provisions of Chapter 1 of the Code, and in stating for him,
in more readily understandable language, some of the mysteries concealed in the statutory verbiage.
This reviewer cannot resist expressing at this point his considered
opinion, which, it is safe to say, is shared by most of those who have
had to contend with tax statutes for any length of time, that a serious
effort should be made to draft such statutes in readily intelligible
language. One obvious improvement would be the elimination of the
many unwieldy sentences and the substitution therefor of a series of
shorter sentences. More space would be taken up, to be sure, but, it is
submitted, more sense would be expressed.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

I Members of the New York Bar.
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The material in this guide to the law is presented in accordance
with the order used in the Code. The authors justify this arrangement by the noteworthy statements that the lawyer must know the
Code and its organization if he is to have any sound knowledge of
tax law, and that a good workable knowledge of the Code can only
be obtained through a section-by-section study.
Only the basic provisions of the Code relating to the income tax
are discussed by the authors. Some of those not discussed, however,
are of general importance, such as sections 58, 59 and 60, relating
to the estimated tax, but the authors account for the omission in this
instance by the statement that the problems involved in those sections,
although at times extremely detailed, are not difficult to understand.
Accordingly, the reader is sent to the statute, which the authors assume he has before him. Other sections are not discussed, such as
section 123 (relating to commodity credit loans), section 124 (relating
to amortization deductions), and section 125 (relating to amortizable
bond premiums), for the reason that such provisions are not of general
importance. The authors have by such judicious omissions been able
to keep their treatment within proper bounds for a clear understanding of the basic provisions of the Code concerned with the income tax.
They have placed emphasis where it belongs, and no exception is
taken to the selections of topics as set forth in their book. They have,
for example, managed to discuss personal holding companies at considerable length, considering the size of the volume, even though the
personal holding provisions of the Code are in Chapter 2 rather than
in Chapter 1 thereof. It should also be noted that they have not
overlooked the important principles developed in the cases. As the
authors state, certain important court decisions have become a part
of the basic structure of the tax law.
This guide to the law deserves to be well known. After involvement in the details of tax practice or tax literature, it is, as Randolph
E. Paul says in his introduction, very refreshing to take up a book
such as this.
Roger P. Peters*
LAw AND TACTICS iN Juny TRIs:

The Art of Jury Persuasion,

Tested Court Procedures. By Francis X. Busch.' Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1949. Pp. xxvii, 1147. $17.50. - In his
prefatory remarks to this most recent study of trial court procedure
and jury persuasion, Mr. Busch points out that, "In no branch of the
law does actual experience play as great a part as in the development
of a trial lawyer." A young lawyer's first few experiences in drafting
instruments, for example, may inspire him with confidence in his
*Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 Member of the Chicago Bar.
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ability to tackle another such job. However, the trial of half dozen
jury. cases will not usually advance the trial lawyer very far "along
the road to fame as an acknowledged first-rate advocate. Such acknowledgment comes only after years of practice ...

"

Mr. Busch, in his

Preface, further states:
It is impossible adequately to set down the results of such an experience. Perhaps it is possible to combine a treatise on the general requirements of trial procedure with some practical considerations entering
into the art of advocacy before juries and, by such a combination,
present something of value to the lawyer and law student interested in
jury trial practice. It is the hope of the author that this work may be
found to be such a combination.

Thus does the author indicate the onus of this book. The resulting
work of over 1100 pages is a singular combination of an annotated
statement of legal concepts by which jury trials are governed and a
very practical statement of the techniques by which they are won,
with examples and comment. To fuse the styles necessary to these
very divergent aims is difficult and could only be accomplished so
well by one who, as Mr. Busch, has been 'both teacher and practicing
lawyer, both scholar and warrior "in the bull pen."
The better half of the book is that written by the warrior. It is
the more interesting half, too - and the more informative. In this
portion the author gives us the general principles of his trial technique
in every phase of the trial: the impaneling of the jury, the opening
statement, the direct examination, the cross-examination and so on
through the steps of the jury trial to the verdict. Following the statement of general tactical principles applicable to each phase, the author
then shows the application of the principles in copious examples followed by comments illustrating how the principles have been used.
There are liberal examples to demonstrate all of the general principles
stated in the text. By this very technique the author reveals his
prowess in "the art of persuasion." It is an excellent device to get
across to the reader the result of the author's experience. It is tantamount to having the author take us with him into the courtroom,
allowing us to watch him perform his difficult tasks after being told
his problems and how he will moet them.
One could have only a single criticism of this portion of the book:
it could well have been even more comprehensive. For example, although every writer on the subject, and Mr. Busch is no exception,
reiterates again and again that trials are won or lost by the work
done outside the courtroom and particularly the work on the facts,
there are only twenty-two pages devoted to the problems and techniques of preparation of the facts, allowing but three pages to "interviewing witnesses," and but one page to "provisions of discovery."
By contrast, 133 pages are devoted to discussion and examples of
brilliant cross-examinations.
Like many other similar books, very
little is said about how the lawyer prepared himself for that brilliant
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cross-examination. The reader can only imagine the wonderful story
the author could tell about his experiences in interviewing and dealing
with witnesses before trial, in exploiting fully the methods of discovery
and in developing the many other stratagems which make his work
in court appear both effordess and brilliant. How exceedingly helpful
to the less experienced would have been a study of the relationships
with several witnesses of various types, from the first contact to the
completion of their respective testimony.
The purely "law" portions of the work are accurate, informative
and readable. These portions are in the nature of a source book
of the law governing trials by jury, including a history of the jury
institution. While this part of the book is a compact, very usable reference for the student, it is doubtful if the practicing lawyer
would find it quite so helpful. Since the law governing jury trials
is largely statutory, and differs from state to state, and even between
courts within the same state, the practicing trial lawyer must necessarily turn to the code and court rules of his state on any procedural
question, and not to a single-volume work so broad in nature.
In general, it may be said that Mr. Busch has produced a thoroughly excellent book. At its best, the book ranks with the finest on
trial techniques. At its weakest, it must still be recognized as a
reliable source, and perhaps the most convenient quick source, of the
law of trial by jury.
Thomas M. Scanlon*
RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. By J. M.
O'Neill.' New York City: Harper & Brothers, 1949. Pp. xii, 338.
$4.00. - "If what the American people have deliberately put into the
Constitution is to be disregarded by the Supreme Court, and its exact
opposite . . . is to be enforced simply because the new doctrine fits
the 'zeal' and the 'prepossessions' of the men who happen to be on the
Court at any given time, then the Constitution ceases to be living
law and becomes only an outmoded historical curiosity." 2 In this
book the author does an excellent job of proving that the Supreme
Court did so disregard the Constitution in the language of its decision
in the Everson case 3 and "enforce its exact opposite" in the McCollum
case.4 In the indicated cases, taken together, the Court reached two
brand new and very far reaching conclusions. The first was that the
*Member of the Indianapolis Bar.
I Chairman, Department of Speech, Brooklyn College.
2 Text, at 49-50.
3 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed.
711 (1947).
4 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed.

649 (1948).
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Fourteenth Amendment had made the First Amendment applicable in
all of its terms to the States. This being so, no State may make any
law respecting "an establishment of religion." The second conclusion
was that the provision against "establishment" requires a "wall. of
separation," not only between Church and State, but between Religion
and Government, in all states of the Union.
Professor O'Neill is not satisfied merely to criticize these revolutionary conclusions of the Court as badly mistaken constitutional constructions. He attacks them as deliberate distortions of the very
materials upon which the Justices pretended to rely in their defense of
both propositions.
The author's documentation is impressive. Recalling that the
Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the United States Constitution in 1868, he points out that "between 1870 and 1888 no less
than eleven" different formulations of proposed amendments to put into
the Constitution of the United States restrictions on the freedom of
the states in such domestic concerns as religion and education, were
introduced into Congress... [which] repudiated every one of the proposals." 5 He then makes the obvious point that if the then existing
Fourteenth Amendment had been intended to bring into being against
the states all of the restrictions directed against Congress by the
First Amendment (as the Supreme Court Justices in the indicated
cases declared), then the eleven proposals of constitutional amendments were all quite pointless. Remembering that the Congressmen
of 1870 to 1888 were of the same generation that proposed and adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is surprising now to learn that they
knew less about the scope Qf that Amendment than the Supreme Court
Justices thought they did in 1947 and 1948.
The author subjects each separate judicial opinion rendered in both
the Everson and McCollum cases to critical and devastating analysis.
He concludes that the only possible theory of constitutional validity
for the McCollum decision is bound up with Justice Black's dictum
in his dissent in Adams-on v. California6 that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the entire Federal Bill of Rights completely to the States.
This theory, as Professor O'Neill points out, has never been accepted
by the majority of the Court; however, "since none of the Justices in
that [McCollum] case argued or defended their positions in terms of
accurately cited history or constitutional law, there is no way of
knowing that the Justices were even aware that they were assuming
a theory of application of the Fourteenth Amendment which had been
consistently denied by the Court since 1873 and explicitly repudiated
in Adamson v. Californiain June of 1947." 7
5 Text, at 43.
6 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
7 Text, at 161.
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On the question of what constitutes a religious "establishment," the
author makes the conclusions of the Justices seem even more tortured.
Nevertheless, while most of the language of all the opinions was devoted to this question, the preliminary and casually accepted determination of the Court that the First Amendment is now in all of its
terms a part of the Fourteenth Amendment is so obviously at. variance
with the unbroken historic position of the Supreme Court that the
strained and repetitious arguments on the matter of "establishment"
appear painfully anti-climactic. After making a mistake of the magnitude involved in its first unfortunate "assumption," the Court might
just as easily and with similar justification have assumed its second
point without citation or argument.
When the vexed questions involved in the Everson and McCollum
decisions reach the Supreme Court again - as indeed they sooner or
later must, in such matters as continued tax exemption for church
property - we predict that Professor O'Neill's book will be indispensible reading for the attorneys on both sides.
Clarence Manion*
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THE: A Memorandum. By Brigadier
General Courtney Whitney. Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government
Section, 1950. Pp. 82.

CASE Or GENERAL YAuASHITA,

CASES AND MAERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS.

By Charles T. McCor-

mick and James H. Chadbourn. Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxix, 921. $8.00.
By Roswell Magill.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION.
Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xv, 546. $7.00.
CASES ON THE LAW. OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: Agency and Employment Relations, Including an Introduction to Partnership
Liability. By Alfred F. Conard. Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. xxvi, 661. $7.00.
CASES

ON THE

LAW OF ThusTs.

Second Edition.

By George G.

Bogert. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. 1,
1041. $7.50.
*CONGRESS

MAYES A LAW: The Story behind the Employment Act

of 1946. By Stephen Kemp Bailey. New York City: Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. xii, 282. $3.75.
*FEDERAL INcOxE TAX, THE: A Guide to the Law. By Joyce Stanley
and Richard Kilcullen. New York City: The Tax Club Press,

1948. Pp. xv, 344. $6.00.
*Dean of the College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
*Reviewed in this issue.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
By Laurence P. Simpson.
St. Paul: West. Publishing Co., 1950. Pp. xiv, 569. $7.00.
HumAN RIGHTS: Comments and Interpretations.
A Symposium
Edited by UNESCO with an Introduction by Jacques Maritain.
New York City: Columbia University Press, 1949, Pp. 288.
$3.75.

*HANDBOOiK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE HumA

RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

New York City: Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations,
1950. Pp. 38.
IT's LIBEL OR CONTEMPT IF YOU PRINT IT: A Practical Book on
Libel, Contempt, and Kindred Topics for Lawyers, and for Students and Workers in the Newspaper Field. By Leon R. Yank-

wich. Los Angeles: Parker & Company, 1950. Pp. xvi, 612.
$12.50.
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS.
Translated and Edited by M. Magdalena Schoch.

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University

Press, 1948.

Pp. xxxii, 328. $5.00.
*LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS:
The Art of Jury Persuasion,
Tested Court Procedures. By Francis X. Busch. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1949. Pp. xxvii, 1147. $17.50.
LAWYER''
TAX MANUAL: Procedure, Transactions, Forms. By Alfred
S. Pellard.

New York City: Clark Boardman Company Ltd.,

1949. Pp. xxiii, 582. $12.00.
By Jerome Hall. Indianapolis:
Company, Inc., 1949. Pp. 146. $2.50.

LIvING LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

The Bobbs-Merri
MINIMUM

STANDARDS

OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:

A Survey of

the Extent to which the Standards of the American Bar Association for Improving the Administration of- Justice Have Been
Accepted Throughout the Country. Edited by Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New York City: The Law Center of New York University for the National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949.
Pp. xxxii, 75.2. $7.50.
PARTNERSHIP. By Ludwig Teller. New York City: Harmon Publications, 1949. Pp. xvii, 197. $5.00.
*RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
By J. M.
O'Neill. New York City: Harper & Brothers, 1949. Pp. xii,
338. $4.00.
SENSE OF INJUSTICE, THE:

An Anthropocentric View of Law.

By

Edmond N. Cahn. New York City: New York University
Press, 1949. Pp. 186. $3.50.
TAx PLANNING FOR ESTATES. By William J. Bowe. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1949. Pp. 93. $2.00.
*Reviewed in this issue.

